comprehensive explosion protection of technological equipment in a coal mill - wolff group

comprehensive explosion protection of technological equipment in a coal mill - wolff group

Due to the specificity of technological processes that take place in production equipment such as silos, air filters or built-up transports, the elimination of the formation of explosive atmospheres inside these equipment can be not only complicated and expensive, but sometimes simply unfeasible.

The explosion risk assessment carried out at the cement plant indicated that appropriate measures were needed to protect the technological equipment and to contribute to reducing the level of risk. Explosive safety work was commissioned to GRUPA WOLFF specialists.

Modernisation of the coal mill in terms of explosion safety was necessitated the hazards posed by the coal dust/air mixture at the time of contact with e.g. hot surface, mechanical and electrostatic sparks, open fire source as a source of ignition. The risk was related mainly to the equipment involved in storage, grinding and pneumatic transport processes.

The task of our engineers was to select appropriate technical solutions to protect the equipment forming the entire installation, i.e. coal dust container, mill with dust duct, technological filter and coal conveyors system against the effects of a possible explosion.

As part of the order, our engineers developed the project, as well as delivered and assembled explosion-proof systems. Knowledge and experience in the field of explosion safety and knowledge of the processes carried out by the cement plant helped in the efficient course of work.Below, we demonstrate how the protection of the individual devices was ensured:

As part of the work carried out, the conveyor belt supplying coal dust from the coal hall to the coal dust tank was partially covered and the transfer of coal dust was reinforced. This enabled the installation of an explosion decoupling system by means of HRD cylinders on the hopper.

The coal dust tank itself had not previously been protected against the effects of explosion. If an explosion occurred, the tank would probably be torn apart, and the explosion could spread to the other apparatus of the production plant. Therefore, the tank was secured with the HRD explosion suppression and decoupling system on the side of the conveyor belt.

The mill is equipped with a CO2 inerting system and an inerting system using mineral dust the purpose of which is to reduce the risk of ignition of the product. However, in the event of ignition, these installations would not be able to protect the device from explosion effects.

In view of the above, the coal mill was secured by explosion suppression and decoupling systems a total of 6 HRD cylinders. Five of them were mounted on a coal mill and one on a dust duct transporting dust from the mill to the filter (cutting off the explosion).

The pipeline transporting coal dust vertically downwards from the mill to the filter was additionally protected by a decompression panel on the diverter. In the event of an explosion, the construction will provide a reduction of the explosion pressure in the pipeline and also reduce the risk of explosion transfer from the filter to the mill and vice versa.

Until then, the fabric filter inside the mill had been protected by uncertified explosion relief dampers. As part of the modernisation, they were replaced with certified decompression panels which would ensure even more reliable protection of the device. In the event of an explosion inside the filter, other apparatus of the system are also at risk. For the apparatus protection, the explosion isolation/decoupling system was applied by means of HRD cylinders on the dust channel (transport of coal dust from the mill to the filter). One of the HRD cylinders was used for protecting a small buffer tank located between the filter and the screw pump.

The modernization of the coal mill was subjected to the as-built explosion risk assessment prepared by our ATEX specialists. It was aimed at assessing the technical condition, effectiveness and usability of the technical solutions applied.

Undoubtedly, the modernisation of the coal mill has significantly improved the explosion safety of the plant and therefore no further risk reduction measures are required. It should be noted here that in the event of changes within the area covered by the modernisation that are important from the point of view of security, it will be necessary to update ATEX documents.

Design office Fire protection solutions Engineering systems designs Fire safety Fire detection and alarm system Spark extinguishing systems Extinguishing systems Smoke removal and ventilation system Sound alarm systems Ex-Signal and escape sign luminaires Explosion safety Explosion protection Explosion suppression Explosion relief (venting) Explosion decoupling (isolation) Spark detection and extinguishing system Electrostatic earthing Flame arresters ATEX case studies and ATEX training ATEX training Explosion Safety Audit Determining Explosion Risk Zones Explosion Risk Assessment Explosion Protection Document CONTACT +48 12 2018 100 [email protected] ABOUT US Blog Express Przemysowy GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALES Electrical Equipment Electrical connectivity EX ATEX Ex-Junction boxes and terminal enclosures ATEX Ex-Control units and control stations ATEX Ex-Safety and main current switches ATEX Ex-Control and distribution systems ATEX Ex-Cable glands ATEX Optical-acoustic signaling EX ATEX EX lighting EX-linear light fittings ATEX Ex LED lighting ATEX EX-Ceiling pendant light fittings and floodlights ATEX EX-Signal and escape sign luminaires ATEX Portable EX-hand lamps ATEX EX Heating Room heaters Fan heaters Line liquid heaters Process media heaters Cabinet and enclosure heaters EX Thermostats Industrial Equipment Screening machines Mills for powders Valves / gates / dampers Sampling of loose material Granulators, dryers, coolers Magnetic separators Transport equipment Bead mills / mixers / deaerators Sludge and suspensions dryers / flakers Liquid samplers Industrial fittings Bursting discs Safety valves Reducing valves Breather valves Flame arresters Modernisation / Installation / Service Industrial systems and equipment service Industrial automation Modernisation and installation of equipment and steel structures Systems relocation Electric works for the industry Offer ATEX Explosion Risk Assessment Explosion Hazard Zones Explosion Protection Document EPD ATEX training HAZOP studies safety analysis of process systems ATEX audits and expert opinions Definition WOLFF GROUP provides specialised engineering works for broad industrial applications. Our activities include: explosion and process safety, turn-key construction of industrial systems, production and supply of process equipment and instruments as well as transfer of new technologies. Over 25 years of operation we have been trusted by hundreds of companies thank you. Copyright 2014 - WOLFF GROUP. All rights reserved.

WOLFF GROUP provides specialised engineering works for broad industrial applications. Our activities include: explosion and process safety, turn-key construction of industrial systems, production and supply of process equipment and instruments as well as transfer of new technologies. Over 25 years of operation we have been trusted by hundreds of companies thank you.

cement plants | kidde fire systems

cement plants | kidde fire systems

The Cement/Lime industry has had to search for a way to reduce costs and this has resulted in the near standardization of coal-fired (or coke) systems for firing up the kiln. These systems are indirect-fired, where coal is crushed in mills/pulverizers, then classified by size for collection as a fuel or dust through a heated air conveyance network. This network generally includes a mill, classifier, cyclone, pulverized fuel bin, surge bin, dust collector and interconnecting ductwork.

Kidde Fire Systems products address fire protection and inerting applications for the pulverized coal/coke systems. In the conveyance network, where the fuel travels through the network, CO2 fire protection is used to suppression fire that can develop between the mill and the dust collector. Liquid CO2 manages these fires based on the NFPA 12 standard for fire protection.

However, in the pulverized coal bins and the dust collector hoppers, fine particles of fuel can rest or be stored until the fuel is to be sent to the burner. These particles are easily subject to spontaneous combustion.

Our solution to this second problem is CO2 inerting. Vapor CO2 is injected into these compartments for prolonged periods of time or until products of coal decomposition are reduced to an acceptable level. This solution may be used for raw coal silo application as well.

See how Kidde Fire Systems' products can protect your application. The links below will take you to detailed product information on our fire protection solutions that are recommended for this industry.

coal bunker fire extinguishing, fire and safety equipment, india

coal bunker fire extinguishing, fire and safety equipment, india

A deep-seated hot spot in bulk storage can be very difficult to extinguish. Earlier detection is key when combating a silo/bunker fire. Fixed CO monitoring equipment has been proven to be the most effective tool in detecting the early signs of combustion.

The principle of this protection is to push CO2 vapour through the coal, reach the level of absorption, and fill all the void spaces between the coal particlestoreduce the oxygen available to the fire to near zero. Holding this condition long enough will effect fire extinguishment. To inert the coal, CO2 vapours used. CO2 injected in to the bottom of the bunker has been reported effective in smoothening fires.

Use of a laser pyrometer or thermal imaging camera will greatly improve the ability to quickly locate the seat of the fire and identify where the smouldering coal exists in a large bunker or coal feeder body.

millwatch: coal and biomass mills carbon monoxide detector | ametek land

millwatch: coal and biomass mills carbon monoxide detector | ametek land

We introduce early detection techniques of spontaneous combustion in coal and biomass handling, storage, milling and transportation. Attendees will learn about issues involved and how AMETEK Land can help producers and users to operate their sites more safely and effectively.

We introduce early detection techniques of spontaneous combustion in coal and biomass handling, storage, milling and transportation. Safe handling practices are designed to ensure that the fuel remains intact throughout its journey. As coal and biomass fuels are susceptible to spontaneous combustion, and this can occur at any stage of storage, production or transport, continuous and reliable monitoring is required. Early detection of combustion or hot spots is an important safety control.

gas detection systems | fixed monitors & equipment

gas detection systems | fixed monitors & equipment

Conspec products support the Mining, Oil & Gas, Power Generation, HVAC and other Industrial markets around the globe. We remain on the leading edge of gas detection technology by utilizing state of the art components in conjunction with NDIR, electrochemical, PID, and catalytic bead type sensors. Engineered for simplicity, reliability, and performance in some of the harshest environments, Conspec gas monitors continue to maintain affordability and low cost-of-ownership. With the customer in mind, we have designed our systems for easy installation and limited maintenance to reduce labor and ensure profitability.

Conspecs individual customer approach allows us to meet and exceed our customers needs while providing quick delivery, quality products, and a high standard of customer support. Our Sales Team and Application Engineers will work with you to determine the most appropriate solution for your specific needs including sample draw systems, inline detection, and leak detection for custom processes. Conspecs 24/7 Technical Support can commission and support your system ensuring employees and assets are given the highest level of protection.

Our mission is to strengthen our customers businesses by protecting their people and environment; to lead the industry by providing exceptional customer service and customized products. Allow Conspecs 50 years of experience to design, deliver, and support your gas detection equipment today.

designing for plant fire protection | power engineering

designing for plant fire protection | power engineering

Because of the Increasingly Competitive Nature of the Electric Power Generation Market, Reduced plant staffing and stricter OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) requirements for employee fire fighting capabilities, builders of new generating stations need to place increased emphasis on fixed fire protection systems. Owners, investors, operators and insurers want to minimize the impacts and consequences of fires, which can damage critical equipment and reduce availability and reliability of power supplies.

Drafting specifications for a new station requires knowledge of the related codes and standards governing the design and installation of water supplies, suppression systems and life safety equipment. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is the most recognized authority, publishing codes, standards and recommended practices in various fire protection areas (see table). NFPA 850, Electric Generating Stations and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations, contains the general protection criteria for the plant and for the individual equipment. Specific design and installation requirements are contained in other NFPA standards.

Prompt detection of fire is critical to employee evacuation and for notification of the fire department and plant emergency organization. All fire alarms should be announced on a central panel, plainly visible in the control room. The alarm system, in accordance with NFPA standards, should include the announcement of fire alarms, supervisory signals and trouble signals. Alarms require immediate action. Supervisory signals indicate an abnormal condition that should be investigated and corrected. Trouble signals indicate an adverse component or hardware condition such as an interrupted circuit, ground fault or power supply problem and should be repaired by qualified personnel. The current state-of-the-art alarm system is a microprocessor-based addressable system. Each detector or component has an identification, or address, and is connected to the control unit by a common conductor. The control unit and initiating devices (i.e., detectors) communicate on a regular frequency to verify that everything is operating normally.

Protection of the power block requires both passive (building features) and active (suppression) protection. Two-hour fire-rated construction, separation distances of at least 30 feet, or suppression systems such as water curtains should be provided to all exposed operations, which include offices, storage areas/warehouses, maintenance shops, control rooms, electrical rooms, cable spreading areas, battery rooms, fuel handling and transfer areas, turbine generators, boilers, fire pumps and diesel generators.

Boilers. Boiler or steam generator burners should be equipped with the recommended combustion safeguards in accordance with NFPA standards. Where fuel oil is used, the firing aisles should be protected by automatic sprinklers, including 30 feet beyond the burners and over nearby cable trays. Firing aisle floors should be of solid construction with containment or drainage to prevent burning liquid from exposing other burner levels.

Combustion turbines. Most combustion turbine packages are installed with pre-engineered gaseous suppression systems, typically CO2. Protection is usually provided for the accessory, turbine, load and generator bearing compartments. As with any gaseous fire suppression, CO2 needs a minimum concentration (34 percent) to extinguish fire, which needs to be increased for specific hazards. Openings in the enclosure, faulty dampers or hardware can compromise this concentration. A common fallacy is that vendors are reluctant to prove the integrity of the fire suppression systems by performing a discharge/concentration test, due to the cost. The unsuccessful operation of a fire suppression system can result in damage equivalent to 45 percent of a unit`s installed cost. Therefore, every gaseous fire suppression system should undergo a complete acceptance test, including a discharge/concentration test during which the actual agent concentration is measured with an analyzer at various points within the enclosure.1

Lube oil systems. Most turbine-generator fires involve oil. Oil escaping from the turbine/generator lube system can ignite on nearby hot turbine surfaces and involve the area below the turbine operating floor. An uncontrolled fire at the bearings, usually from a ruptured seal, can result in damages of up to 25 percent of the turbine generator unit`s cost. The preferred protection for steam turbine-generators is automatic sprinklers under the entire turbine operating floor, including any mezzanines between the equipment floor and the turbine level, and under the condenser. Spill containment in the form of drains, curbs, pits and/or trenches should be incorporated into the building design to contain accidental lube oil releases, from both a fire protection and environmental standpoint. Note that the intent is to contain and control a fire; therefore, sprinkler protection needs to be provided over all areas that are subject to oil flow, accumulation or spray. Where containment is impractical, a foam-water sprinkler system should be considered. The foam blanket will smother the burning liquid and help prevent fire from spreading. Automatic fire suppression also needs to be provided over the turbine and generator bearings and any lube oil lines, including under the turbine lagging. The intent is not to protect the bearings but to provide protection from an oil fire.

A 1985 EPRI report indicates that fire damage outweighs the effects of applying water to a steam turbine from a properly designed suppression system. Preaction waterspray systems are best suited for turbine fire protection because of their high assurance against inadvertent discharge (see Power Engineering, April 1998). The favored preaction waterspray configuration requires two nozzles at the 10 o`clock and 2 o`clock positions over each bearing. The hydraulic demands of the bearing and turbine deck systems should be added since both systems can be expected to operate simultaneously.

Cable trays. Cable trays present a unique hazard in that fire damage to even a small area of cable can cause extensive disruption to operations. Cable trays should be routed away from major fire exposure hazards, sources of ignition, boiler fronts and flammable or combustible liquids. The accumulation of coal dust in a cable tray can result in spontaneous combustion and subsequent fire. If coal dust or an oil spill potential is present, the cable trays should be covered and solid bottom trays should not be used. If exposures cannot be avoided, fire retardant coatings or specifically designed blankets can be applied to the cables and the tray.

Cooling towers. Where practical, non-combustible towers are preferred. As incredible as it seems, cooling towers have burned down while in operation. Combustible towers should be provided with automatic sprinkler protection, including protection over the electric fan motors. Wet pipe (climate permitting), dry pipe and deluge systems are suitable for a counterflow tower, although deluge systems provide a higher degree of protection. Only deluge systems are adequate for cross-flow towers due to the differences in placement of heat detectors and sprinklers inside the tower. Vibration monitoring with a fan interlock to trip the fan motor as well as a waterflow interlock and trip are necessary; otherwise the high draft will not allow adequate water penetration to the seat of the fire. It is accepted practice to install a switch to reactivate the fan in case of an inadvertent trip.

Control Rooms, Computer Rooms and Electrical Areas. One of the most common concerns from fire protection laymen is the application of water to electrical/electronic equipment. Many studies conducted by insurance carriers and government agencies have shown that the water damage caused by sprinklers is insignificant when compared to the damage caused by fire. The reason for this is that most fires are controlled by only a few sprinklers which would affect a relatively small area. Electrical and electronic equipment can be cleaned, rinsed with deionized water and dried with minimal damage.

Designers should give special attention to the design of the control room, since the evacuation of control room personnel may be delayed for emergency shutdown procedures. Since a view of the turbine deck is usually desired, the glass between the control room and the turbine deck should be fire rated or protected by window sprinklers or fire-rated shutters. In accordance with life safety regulations, at least two exits must be available from any room. In the case of a turbine fire, the exit to the turbine deck may be inaccessible, and another exit with a 2-hour fire rated path is necessary. The need for proper exits was demonstrated in an unfortunate incident at a cogeneration facility which took the lives of three operators in 1992.2 Control rooms and computer rooms should also be provided with preaction sprinkler protection (similar to turbine-generator bearings) or a halon-alternative gaseous fire suppression system, other than carbon dioxide. While halon-alternative gaseous fire suppression systems provide a good level of protection, a preaction sprinkler system can be less expensive to install and maintain while providing a satisfactory level of protection.

Cable tunnels and vaults present an extreme challenge to manual fire fighting due to their limited accessibility and minimal visibility in a fire. In addition, burning PVC insulation liberates hydrogen chloride (HCl) gas. Burn tests conducted and witnessed by HSB Professional Loss Control have shown that even `fire retardant` cable insulation will burn quite readily once ignited. Also, these areas are typically a vital component of the plant and fire damage would cause an extended shutdown.

Cable penetrations through fire-rated walls or floors should be designed to be readily sealed with listed/approved firestopping materials such as ceramic and mineral fibers, silicone, foams and intumescent materials. Their fire ratings should match those of the wall or floor. Note that urethane foam, even if fire retardant, is not an equivalent firestopping material.

Transformers. Outdoor oil-filled transformers containing over 500 gallons of oil should be protected by separation distance, rated fire walls or automatic waterspray systems. Studies by Factory Mutual have indicated that approximately one out of ten transformer failures will be followed by fire. If adequate exposure protection is not provided, a fire involving one transformer can easily damage adjacent transformers or important structures. Loss experience reveals that repairs to fire-damaged transformers usually are not justified. A risk-based study by Hartford Steam Boiler concluded that waterspray deluge systems are usually not economically justified for transformers under 300 MVA if adequate separation distance or properly designed fire walls are provided.

Deluge sprinkler systems for cooling towers can have demands exceeding 1,500 gpm. With the required 500 gpm for hose streams, this can add up to over 2,000 gpm. Per NFPA 850, the minimum required duration of a water supply is 2 hours, which would result in a required volume of 240,000 gallons in the case above. Note that many insurers require a longer duration depending on the location and remoteness of the plant. To provide redundancy, two fire pumps, one diesel and one electric, are usually installed in parallel, with either pump meeting the full fire flow requirements. Although economically attractive, a cooling tower basin is generally not a reliable source since it will be emptied at some times for repairs or cleaning, leaving the entire plant without protection. The exception to this would be a split basin, with pump suction capability from either basin, or a fire pump taking suction from a second cooling tower, provided that the required volume can be supplied.

A system of underground water mains needs to be provided. This should consist of a minimum 6-inch loop around the power block, with individual legs to the equipment/buildings provided with hydrants and sprinkler systems. The location of fire main isolation valves should be arranged such that any section of the loop can be isolated without impairing fire protection systems. Valves should be of the post indicating type. Hydrants should be provided at least 40 feet from buildings/structures and should be spaced so that any building/structure can be reached with a 250-foot maximum radius. It is acceptable to use non-indicating underground valves for individual hydrants. p

Oil-filled transformer fire caused by turbine disintegration. A waterspray fire suppression system was provided but damaged by turbine part projectiles. Note the effectiveness of the fire walls, but openings in the wall above the transformer could expose inside equipment and cause smoke damage.

Dominique Dieken, P.gif., CFPS, is a senior engineer with HSB Professional Loss Control. He provides field engineering for electric power generation facilities in the Western U.S. and Europe. He is a graduate of Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, is a registered fire protection engineer and holds a National Board Commission.

dss055: coal mill safety in cement production industries with vincent grosskopf - dust safety science

dss055: coal mill safety in cement production industries with vincent grosskopf - dust safety science

In this episode of the DustSafetyScience Podcast, we interview Vincent Grosskopf, founder of Coal Mill Safety. He has over 40 years of experience in bulk material handling industries, 25 of which were spent in dust explosion protection through Thorwesten Vent based in Germany. Hes been semi-retired since 2011 and now does tactical consulting, specifically working with cement production industries.

Vincent reached out to Dr. Chris Cloney after we released our 2019 mid-year report and commented that were not capturing nearly as many coal dust explosions that actually occur. Hes right: these incidents are often reported as boiler explosions or something else because there is no mention of the fuel involved. Today, Vincent shares his experience with coal mill safety in cement production facilities and answers questions like the following:

Vincent explained that the cement industry almost exclusively uses indirect (also known as storage) firing systems with an air swept mill. All air and material goes to a form of intermediate storage like a bag filter, and from the bag filter it mechanically or pneumatically goes to a silo, where it will be fed to the burners.

He said that in recent cases like the September 29 boiler explosion in India, a direct coal-fired system was likely being used to generate power for the plant. While this is not standard practice in cement production, cement plants in countries like India are often located far away from energy sources, so they rely on their own sources.

Power generation typically involves direct firing systems. There is an air swept mill with direct pneumatic conveying through to the burners. The risk of explosions is more or less reduced to an explosion inside the mill, which therefore needs to be explosion, pressure, and shock-resistant. NFPA requires coal mills to be good for 50 PSI.

Most systems in the cement industry work with low oxygen levels. They can take air with 3% oxygen from the preconsigner and feed it to the mill, which normally has an inert atmosphere. Things can go wrong because the oxygen concentration can drop and suddenly go up, and as soon as it becomes more than 12 or 13%, an explosive atmosphere starts. The only thing missing is the ignition source.

There appears to be a general consensus in cement production that there isnt a dust explosion hazard, as powdered cement is not a combustible dust. This often means that there are no prevention or protection measures in place for the coal milling systems.

Vincent explained that the quality of protection in a system depends on how well the designing engineers understand the hazards. Some systems are well protected, he said. Or I can see no system. No system I see in the field is perfectly protected.

He said that he has gone through plants with explosion experts who are unfamiliar with coal systems. They are used to hazardous situations in the chemical or pharmaceutical industry and will discover only a few things wrong with a coal-burning system.

Vincent wrote an article about coal milling safety in cement production for Global Cement. In it, he talked about facilities that have old equipment and if they replace it, its usually the same type and outdated from a safety standard.

He explained that these equipment designs are up to 40 years old. Pieces of equipment like mills or bag filters may have a lot of new features, but the basic concept for a coal-burning system is outdated because engineering companies are using the designs over and over again. This tendency makes it difficult to get the necessary corrections into the new designs.

Vincent pointed out that there is a poor understanding of the connection between the mill and the bag filter, a so-called riser duct that can be very long. Flame propagation through ducts will accelerate in relationship to the Length-to-diameter ratio. Proper venting on the riser duct can avoid flame acceleration.

Although NFPA68 and some European standards address explosion venting, there is no standard for fire protection. When the vents remain open, the filter will be open to the atmosphere, with oxygen available to feed the fire and nitrogen would get out, enabling the fire to escalate after the explosion.

In Episode #38, Dr. Chris Bloore made a similar point. You protect a facility from an explosion, but the ensuing fire is what destroys your equipment. Dr. Bloore recommended putting sprinklers in the ducting line. If youre ducting an explosion vent to an outside wall, it might be an important safety measure.

The problems always start at the yard, he said. There is a lot of exposure to sun and when there is a certain level of humidity, the coal will start to heat up and that intensified oxidation can further intensify due to an open fire.

People are not ready to work on that, he continued. They will try to do something with water. They have no strategy in place to get rid of that problem, and the coal with that kind of oxidation going on will end up in the plant, which is the worst thing to happen.

When this self-oxidizing coal goes into the conveyor and gets pulled into the grinder, it meets an ignition source. Vincent warned that facilities need to have grounding or inerting systems in place: static electricity can become a problem even with coal dust.

Vincent recommended that cement associations get involved in improving safety in their coal-milling systems. The Wood Pellet Association of Canada did something similar for its industry. With industry support, those who work in cement plants will have a better understanding of what can go wrong and plan accordingly.

If you have questions about the contents of this or any other podcast episode, you can go to our Questions from the Community page and submit a text message or video recording. We will then bring someone on to answer these questions in a future episode.

Todays episode of the Dust Safety Science podcast features a replay of the opening keynote from the 2021 Dust Safety Conference. Titled Combustible Dust Safety: Open Challenges and Charting a Path Forward and presented by Dr. Chris Cloney, it [Read More...]

In todays episode of the Dust Safety Science podcast, Chrissy Klocker, Applications Engineering Manager at Donaldson Company based in St. Paul, Minnesota, talks about five misconceptions surrounding the collection of combustible dust. Chrissy did [Read More...]

At 9:11 a.m. on the morning of July 17, 2015, fire bells went off at both the Cheshire Fire and Rescue Services Macclesfield and Congleton Fire Stations. Responders noted the location- Wood Treatment Ltd. at Bosley Mill in Congleton- as they rushed [Read More...]

Become a Dust SafetyMember Companyto list your products and services where the combustible dust community can find them. Members receive a full listing in the directory and are featured on the database homepage and incident pages.

Get in Touch with Mechanic
Related Products
Recent Posts
  1. schou1500crankshaftgrindingmachine africa

  2. mining grinding machinery

  3. limestone grinding mill manufactures

  4. mill manufacturers for sale

  5. prym knitting mill maxi loom

  6. mining milling buckle

  7. raymonds grinding mill

  8. crushers mill for sale south africa

  9. taclk grinding machines

  10. raymond woolen mills ltd pitampura

  11. li ne crushing grinding plant in sikkim

  12. surplus crusher plant korea

  13. stone rotary dryer

  14. shaking table test liquefaction

  15. stone crusher plant in telangana

  16. high frequency screening plant

  17. almaty high quality new bauxite flotation cell

  18. gold mining equipment for sale b c small scale

  19. patan high quality portable calcite pellet making machine manufacturer

  20. tangible benefits small chrome ore high efficiency concentrator sell at a loss in kigali